spanx0r
December 8th, 2002, 06:01 PM
I had an idea of a p2p network which hides the IP addresses of participants. It would involve a double proxy scheme:
A---pA---pB---B
where A is sharing, B is receiving, and pA and pB are proxys (other p2p participants) chosen by A and B respectivly.
The idea is that since A chooses pA and B chooses pB, each can trust their proxy not to betray them. It doesn't matter if B is a lawyer and chooses pB to be his co-lawyer, because pA will still protect A. Similarly if A is a lawyer sharing files (or is that entrapment? I wouldn't put it past them) pB will hide B's identity.
I'm stuck though on creating some kind of web of trust in the system. Some kind of "distributed-kudos" system is needed (probably involving public key crypto). A needs to make sure that B hasn't sent a request packet with time-to-live of 1 straight to A, because then if pA sends pack the offer, B will know that it was A. I'm thinking some kind of history of hops in the request packet; A checks out some of the hops through linked trusts back to A. If the hops check out, A can be sure that it is not the only node to receive the request, so it can safely reply through pA.
One idea: every node has an ID which is not at all ascociated with it's IP (it's an alias). So when B downloads off A illegaly, A gives B some "kudos", a referance, which others can request in order to trust B.
Second problem. I'm worried about the overhead of such a system. In a couple of years everyone should be broadband and pings will be better, will this be feasable?
A---pA---pB---B
where A is sharing, B is receiving, and pA and pB are proxys (other p2p participants) chosen by A and B respectivly.
The idea is that since A chooses pA and B chooses pB, each can trust their proxy not to betray them. It doesn't matter if B is a lawyer and chooses pB to be his co-lawyer, because pA will still protect A. Similarly if A is a lawyer sharing files (or is that entrapment? I wouldn't put it past them) pB will hide B's identity.
I'm stuck though on creating some kind of web of trust in the system. Some kind of "distributed-kudos" system is needed (probably involving public key crypto). A needs to make sure that B hasn't sent a request packet with time-to-live of 1 straight to A, because then if pA sends pack the offer, B will know that it was A. I'm thinking some kind of history of hops in the request packet; A checks out some of the hops through linked trusts back to A. If the hops check out, A can be sure that it is not the only node to receive the request, so it can safely reply through pA.
One idea: every node has an ID which is not at all ascociated with it's IP (it's an alias). So when B downloads off A illegaly, A gives B some "kudos", a referance, which others can request in order to trust B.
Second problem. I'm worried about the overhead of such a system. In a couple of years everyone should be broadband and pings will be better, will this be feasable?