How about Ants network currently?

[xrobot]

I mean whether it is easy to connect smoothly, with acceptable number of (updated) files and people for p2p to be meaningful?

[CactusChris]

Connection seems no problem, files are patchy and download speeds vary depending on who one's peers are. I think that I've done ok if I get 1% input compared to throughput, but have had times where I have had 20%. The network is now stable it seems but there is some optimisation needed - like search horizons - in general it is coming along nicely and is a credit to Gwren.
Best regards
Chris

[xrobot]

I hope Ants can grow up fast, at this moment I still caution with java. However, if the network is ok, I think I should give it a try. Will I regret?

[CactusChris]

Interesting views ABC. I hope that Gwren is going to continue to develop ANts - but an official release will perhaps be the signal that our 'daily' updates are over, though it already feels like that at the moment. I agree that the network (with more people or not) is not fast enough to attract many people - except those interested parties in anon networks or those that are truely paranoid.
The code is open source - maybe we need a Nate or Eric so that there will be a spinoff of ANts that continues to develop. btw I agree Nate and Eric have done a great job - both programs are much better than the original MUTE 4.
So - here is the advert:
WANTED - PROGRAMMER - must be experienced in Java and have a sense of humour, must be willing to work for the good of mankind (ie no pay), and has to be able to work under pressure. The task is to make the slow into the fast by devising better ways to communicate while never forgetting the main aim - anonymity.
Best regards
Chris

[fnordprefect]

ABC what is your problem?

When Ants first made a blip on the radar here you were the biggest fanboy around, and it's partly your fault that so many people here don't like Ants. Your thread spam turned a lot of people against us.

Now, things aren't moving quite as quickly as you'd like and you're all upset?
Have you paid for any of the work Gwren has done? No? Then stop whining.

If you have nothing constructive to say, just go away and leave us in peace.

I'm grateful for everything Gwren has done for the anonymous P2P community.
Whether or not Ants P2P becomes a success or not, it has raised awareness of the issues and technologies at least.

[Siskabush]

You guys really need your own private forum so you can spam and no one will see it.

[CactusChris]

Siskabush - I've been really patient with your constant spamming of this forum - if you have nothing constructive to add why don't you leave us alone in our own forum going about our discussions.
BEST REGARDS
An angry CactusChris

[Mels_Smileys45]

I wish you guys the best of luck. I wish ANTS would become a success for the future of P2P also :gj

[fnordprefect]

Oh, and if Napshare is so marvellous, and Ants is no good, what about this from the Napshare 2.1 release thread?:
-----------------------
Posted by: ABC_thellookoflove @ 2005-02-06 12:08:44 Ratings: 0% agree
100% disagree Rate
Rate

it does not have end to end encryption and every node and every ISP can read what media you forward for others!!! this is really not safe. and then it is not anonymous. because every ISP can attac you. and every direct ip node as well. Better use ants ! this has end to end and your ISP cannot read what you send for your and for others.
-----------------------
[bolding added for emphasis]

Siskabush, please stop trolling. We are in the Ants forum right now. If you don't like seeing Ants threads, maybe you shouldn't read/post to them.

[Hornet]

You guys really need your own private forum so you can spam and no one will see it.

Stop spamming, trolling and flaming burger boy Siskabush.

It's trailer trash like you that make the RIAA/MPAA's job easier.

Good thing you're in the backwoods in Canada or you would get your stupid ass kicked.

We can't all be intelligent but we all need common sense and you are lacking in that department.

So say sorry and if you can't manage that creep back to mummy (or mods) and have a good cry about those beastly ANts people.

BTW super size me!


Hornet :ass :ass :ass

[CactusChris]

fnorprefect - in Mute the nodes can see what is passing through but not who to, apart from the fact that it is going to the next in line. The ISPs cannot see what is going through because there is node-node encryption. Yes they could intercept the key before transfer starts - but this is a problem with ANts as well (I think).
Best regards
Chris

[The Hunter]

Siskabush, please drop it, as they are posting in the Ants section.

[fnordprefect]

Thanks for the info Chris.

I think you are right that both Ants and Mute are vulnerable to Man-in-the-middle attacks by ISPs. Unfortunately I don't think there's a lot we can do about it.

I'd say Ants is better becasue it would take a lot more resources on the part of the MitM to mount such an attack. There would be twice the number of encryption/decryption steps to take on each packet, or am I wrong?

[Hornet]

fnorprefect - in Mute the nodes can see what is passing through but not who to, apart from the fact that it is going to the next in line. The ISPs cannot see what is going through because there is node-node encryption. Yes they could intercept the key before transfer starts - but this is a problem with ANts as well (I think).
Best regards
Chris

Chris shame on you :tilted

You cannot intercept key and use it before transfer as key cannot be spoofed as is SAME as node ID.

ISPs CANNOT SEE WHAT IS BEING TRANSFERED EVER.

See below.

How to tackle Man-in-the-middle attacks in a computer network

Abstract:

This short paper describes a naïve, but actually effective technique to grant some basic properties of a secure net at low level (net layer), in particular secure node identification and non-repudiation of messages.

Details:

The idea is to use a particular Digital Signature public key as ID (i.e. address) on the net.

The key can be released by a certified authority, i.e. IANA exactly the same way IPs are given, or it can be randomly chosen by a node that wants to log on the net.

A node will use its private Digital Signature key to sign its messages so that everyone on the ANts P2P net will be able to verify if a message from the node identified by a particular ID (i.e. public key or address if you like) is spoofed or valid.

The method is computationally secure because it implies no DH exchange or communication stuff.

A node, once connected, simply publishes its ID on the net and it'll be the only one able to use that ID to route messages on the net itself.

Spoofed message will be automatically rejected by other nodes, cause the spoofer will not be able to create a fake signature (unless he can perform a 1024 bit factorization).

Dedicated techniques to prevent ID collisions must be implemented, even if with the current Digital Signatures techniques the algorithms usually are collision free with an high probability.

This technique is very effective expecially in dynamic nets, where new nodes can log on using a new and unique address in an easy way, being sure that no one will be able to spoof their address.

Gwren
(http://www.myjavaserver.com/~gwren/Ants/How%20to%20tackle%20Man-in-the-middle%20attacks%20in%20a%20computer%20network.pdf )
12/10/2004

Hornet :fire :hole :fire

[CactusChris]

Hi fnordprefect - MITM is a different issue to ISPs.
In the case of ANts the ISPs are passing through encrypted material - and to get hold of the key to unlock it they would have to intercept the packets that contain the keys, keep them and then try the keys on all the packets passing through, all without disrupting the flow of the packets (although at some of our speeds this would not be noticed). As the proxy process is mostly data that is not for the ISP client but moves on, and the keys may have gone a different route this is a difficult process. Also ANts encrypts (I think) node to node as well as start to end so the process is made twice as difficult. I think that the node to node key is exchanged on peer connection.
In the case of MUTE only node to node keys are used, so once they have the key exchanged on peer connection they can use it for all packets coming from that peer. If they had them all (ie keys sent to the user and keys sent from the user to each connected peer) in theory they could look and see what went in, what came out, and the stuff that stayed is either download by the client or dropped packets. This is why making life more difficult with end-end encryption is important.
For MITM attacks a rogue PEER attemts to check the packets passing through - this is more difficult as they will see only part of what you receive and part of what you send - so making a judgement of what stayed at your node is more difficult. With end to end encryption the key may have passed through the MITM, as an unencrypted packet at the MITM node (or else how would the sender know what to use), if it has they can use it to de-encrypt packets from the original sender. This is why Jason says that end to end encryption lends a false sense of security - and why there was talk of trying to make the key exchange take a different route to the data.

Best regards
Chris